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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the role of inclusive human development and military expenditure in 
fighting terrorism in 53 African countries for the period 1998-2012. The empirical evidence is 
based on contemporary, non-contemporary and instrumental variable Fixed Effects 
regressions. Inclusive development is not a sufficient condition for the fight against terrorism 
whereas military expenditure can be effectively employed to mitigate the phenomenon. 
Significant negative effects are established only when endogeneity is accounted for by means 
of non-contemporary and instrumental-variables approaches. Hence, the policy effectiveness 
of employed tools is contingent on whether they are engaged proactively (i.e. non-
contemporarily) or not.  From the findings, the propensity of military expenditure to fight 
transnational terrorism is higher in: (i) middle income countries vis-à-vis their low income 
counterparts; (ii) oil-rich countries compared to oil-poor countries and (iii) Christian-
dominated countries vis-à-vis their Islam-oriented counterparts. Furthermore military 
expenditure is also more effective at combating domestic and transnational terrorism in: (i) 
North African countries vis-à-vis their sub-Saharan Africa counterparts; (ii) landlocked 
countries compared to countries that are open to the sea and (iii) politically-stable countries 
vis-à-vis their politically-unstable counterparts. Contributions to the comparative economics 
are discussed. Practical and theoretical contributions are also provided.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 An inquiry into the comparative African economics of inclusive development and 
military expenditure in fighting terrorism has a fivefold motivation, notably: (i) growing 
extreme poverty trends in Africa and the post-2015 development agenda; (ii) debates on the 
impact of poverty and human development on terrorism; (iii) increasing terrorism in Africa; 
(iv) debates surrounding the effect of military expenditure on terrorism and (v) gaps in the 
literature. The motivations are discussed in chronological order. 
 First, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) targets revealed that extreme poverty had been decreasing in all regions of the 
world with the exception of Africa. The report maintained that 45% of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) were substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty 
target (World Bank, 2015). This is in spite of, inter alia: the continent enjoying more than two 
decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44); evolving 
narratives of “Africa rising” (Leautier, 2012) and Africa being on time for the MDG extreme 
poverty target (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). The poverty tragedy of the continent has 
motivated a growing stream of literature devoted to: understanding paradigm shifts that are 
essential to elucidating recent poverty trends (Kuada, 2015); examining the role of institutions 
in the continent’s recent growth resurgence and assessing whether the recent resurgence has 
been a reality or a myth (Fosu, 2015b, 2015c; Obeng-Odoom, 2015, 2017).  
Second, there are ongoing debates surrounding the effect of poverty and human 
development on terrorism. These include a:  positive relationship between “GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) per capita in the venue country” and transnational terrorism (Blomberg et 
al., 2004); no nexus between GDP per capita and terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003); 
risk of terrorism not comparatively substantial in poor countries (Abadie, 2006); political 
repression encouraging transnational terrorism, instead of GDP per capita (Krueger & Laitin, 
2008); no causality from the human development index to terrorism (Piazza, 2006); minority 
economic discrimination increasing domestic terrorism  (Piazza, 2011); a positive relationship 
between GDP per capita and terrorism when the viewpoints of victims’ countries are 
considered (Gassenbner & Luechinger, 2011) and negative nexus between GDP per capita 
and terrorism (Li, 2005).  
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 Third, recent narratives are consistent with the position that terrorism is increasingly 
becoming a development challenge to the continent. Whereas the employment of terror and 
violence as means to communicating grievances is not new in Africa, the scale by which 
terrorism has been increasing over the past decade represents a serious policy syndrome 
(Alfa-Wali et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2016a, 2016b; Price & Elu, 2016). Several factors have 
been documented to facilitate the nursing and growth of terrorism, namely: tensions of ethnic 
and tribal nature; within- and between cross-country political instability and religious 
fundamentalism (Fazel, 2013). According to Clavarino (2014), compared to the Middle East, 
there has been less focus on terrorism in Africa: a continent that is experiencing increasing 
radicalisation with Islamic fundamentalists. Notable movements of terrorism that have been 
exerting politico-economic and social disruptions of massive scale include: Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb; the Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabab in Somalia.  
 Fourth, the effect of military expenditure on terrorism is debatable in the literature. As 
recently documented by Feridun and Shahbaz (2010, p.195), there is a consensus in the 
literature that military expenditure does not mitigate terrorism.  Whereas from an intuitive 
perspective, the relationship is expected to be negative, empirical literature does not support 
the intuition because military interventions devoted to reducing terrorism are 
counterproductive. Measures of counterterrorism have been documented to further provoke 
terrorist attacks instead of preventing them (Sandler, 2005). This is consistent with the 
position that the absence of internationally recognised common comprehensive and long-term 
counterterrorism terrorism strategies renders the fight against terrorism ineffective (Omand, 
2005).  According to Lum et al. (2006), the United States’ counter terrorism measures are 
ineffective because the measures instead tend to increase the likelihood for terrorism 
occurrence. More recently, Feridun and Shahbaz (2010) have established a unidirectional 
causality running from terrorism to defense-spending. In the light of the above: (i) the 
intuition that military spending can reduce terrorism still needs to be substantiated with 
empirical validity in the literature and (ii) exclusively anti-terrorism military measures are not 
enough to prevent terrorism.  
 Fifth, there are two main gaps in the terrorism literature, notably: the limited focus of 
empirical studies on Africa and controversial perspectives on the effect of inclusiveness in 
deterring terrorism. With the exception of Li and Schaub (2004) and Piazza (2011), there is 
very little empirical support for the positive relationship between poverty and terrorism. The 
literature on fighting terrorism in Africa has largely  focused on: exploratory and review 
studies on the role of multilateral organisations like the African Union in the battle against 
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terror attacks (Ewi & Aning, 2006); examining the influence of freedoms and poverty on 
terrorism (Barros et al., 2008); the influence of geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012) and the 
role of competition in military companies in the rate at which conflicts are brought to a swift 
end (Akcinaroglu  & Radziszewski,  2013). 
 In the light of the above, this study complements existing literature by investigating 
the role of inclusive human development and military expenditure in the fight against 
terrorism in Africa.  The conception and definition of inclusive human development which is 
consistent with recent literature (Asongu & Le Roux, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a), 
is the human development index (HDI) that is adjusted for inequality. Hence, inclusive human 
development or the inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI) is the HDI that 
accounts for inequality. The HDI denotes a national average of achievements in three main 
areas, namely: health and long life, education or knowledge and basic standards of living. The 
IHDI goes a step further by adjusting the HDI to prevalent levels of inequality in the 
aforementioned three areas. In other words, the IHDI also takes into consideration the manner 
in which the three underlying achievements are distributed within the population. 
In order to avail room for more policy implications, the comparative emphasis is 
articulated with fundamental characteristics of African development, namely: legal origins 
(English common law vs. French civil law), political stability (conflict-affected vs politically 
stable), resource-wealth (resource-rich vs resource-poor), income levels (low income vs 
middle income), regional proximity (SSA vs North Africa), openness to sea (landlocked vs 
unlandlocked) and religious domination (Islam vs Christianity). For instance, while emphasis 
on income-levels accounts for controversial positions in the literature on the income-terrorism 
relationship, the articulation of religious dominations aims to control for the intuition that 
compared to countries with a Christian-domination, those with Islamic-inclination are more 
likely to be affected by terrorist attacks.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, discussion and policy implications while Section 5 concludes with future 
research directions. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence  
 The theoretical underpinning motivating linkages between inclusive development, 
terrorism and military expenditure can be discussed in four main strands. First, consistent with 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2015), the theory of relative deprivation developed by Gurr (1970) 
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establishes the theoretical nexus between political violence and exclusive development. With 
the knowledge that relative deprivation can be understood as “individuals’ expectations of 
economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods” (Piazza, 2006, 
p.162), the theory “is grounded in the assumption that people who engage in rebellious 
political behavior are motivated principally by anger resulting from […] relative deprivation” 
(Muller & Weede, 1994, p. 40).  Therefore, poor economic governance is directly a cause of 
social deprivation. With the understanding that economic governance “is the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities” (see Asongu et al., 2016a), 
discontent over the unequal distribution of economic resources is a cause of political 
aggression (violence).  This underpinning extends to indicators of exclusive human 
development such as inequality and poverty. Hence, in situations of relative deprivation, 
frustration can be voiced by the poor and marginalized who are challenging bad economic 
governance and poor distribution of economic resources.  In summary, exclusive development 
directly induces terrorism by increasing discontent owing to relative deprivation and 
dissatisfaction with economic policies. Moreover, a stream in microeconomic studies has also 
established that unfavorable economic conditions (e.g. unemployment) have motivated 
terrorists to recruit more skilled workers (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Benmelech et al., 2012).  
Second, whereas exclusive development can directly induce terrorism due to relative 
deprivation and frustration, it can also indirectly cause terrorism by consolidating dilapidated 
social conditions. For example, impaired socio-economic development and limited politico-
economic participation could further incite terrorism. First, inequality has been documented to 
lead to a plethora of negative socio-economic outcomes, inter alia: the response of poverty to 
growth is a decreasing function of inequality and inequality decreases human capital 
accumulation that ultimately affects growth (Odhiambo, 2009, 2011; Fosu, 2008, 2009 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c; Elu & Loubert, 2013). Hence deteriorating socio-economic development 
ultimately fuels terrorism. This postulation is consistent with recent empirical literature 
maintaining that poor socio-economic conditions are very likely to motivate the resort to 
violence by citizens as means to making their voices heard (Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Gries 
et al., 2011; Freytag et al., 2011). Second, on the politico-economic participation front, 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) have argued that the political influence of social factions in 
shaping institutions is contingent on the access of resources by various social factions and 
how resources are distributed within society. Under scenarios where institutional power is 
dominated by a selected number of citizens, the rich elite can mobilise sufficient resources to 
create politico-economic institutions that promote their vested interests or consolidate existing 
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institutions that protect such interests. Citizens in the lower socio-economic strata may resort 
to violence in order to change existing institutions that are not serving them. There is growing 
empirical evidence supportive of the likelihood of employing terrorism tactics as means to 
demanding more politico-economic participation (see Basuchoudhary &  Shughart, 2010; 
Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011).  
 Third, in spite of above theoretical underpinnings, empirical evidence is still very 
conflicting on the nexus between inequality and terrorism or political violence. First, the 
nexus between civil conflict/war and inequality remains to be firmly established: “Over the 
past few years, prominent large-N studies of civil war seem to have reached a consensus that 
inequality does not increase the risk of civil war” (Østby, 2008, p. 143). Yet, there is also a 
stream of literature contending that civil conflict is more apparent in societies with high 
inequalities (see Cederman et al., 2011; Baten &  Mumme, 2013; Krieger & Meierrieks,  
2015). Second, with regards to the nexus between inequality and terrorism, the empirical 
evidence is also mixed at best. Whereas a stream of the literature is supportive of the fact that 
inequality leads to terrorism (Piazza, 2011; 2013), another stream of studies does not support 
the substantial role played by inequality (Li, 2005; Piazza, 2006; Abadie, 2006).  On the 
possible relationship between inequality and domestic versus transnational terrorism, 
domestic terrorism is largely motivated by economic grievances (see Piazza, 2013) whereas 
the grievances fuelling transnational terrorism are traceable to disenchantments in foreign 
policy decisions by wealthy democracies (Savun & Phillips, 2009).  
 Fourth, consistent with Feridun and Shahbaz (2010), there are two main theoretical 
scenarios on the possible nexus between terrorism and military expenditure. On the one hand, 
increasing terrorism intuitively leads to growing defense spending as means to fighting 
terrorism. This is essentially because military expenditure is intuitively expected to be 
increased in response to growing terrorism. Therefore, when terrorists’ attacks are to explain 
military spending, a positive relationship is expected. On the other hand, increased military 
spending is also anticipated to mitigate terrorist activities, assuming that policies on 
increasing military spending are motivated by the need to fight increasing terrorism. 
Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, defense spending and terrorism bear an inverse 
nexus when the former is the independent variable.  
 While the engaged theoretical underpinnings may not be exhaustive, the theoretical 
foundations are to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, it is important to note that reporting 
facts even in the absence of a formal theoretical model is a useful scientific activity. This is 
essentially because, applied econometrics should not be limited to the simple empirical 
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exercise of either refuting or validating economic theories (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan 
et al., 2011). 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This study investigates a panel of 53 African nations with data for the period 1998-
2012. There are three sources of this data: (i) an updated computation of terrorism indicators 
from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012); (ii) the Global Terrorism Database 
and (iii) African Development Indicators (ADI) and World Governance Indicators from the 
World Bank. The choice of the periodicity is essentially motivated by constraints in the 
availability of data. Three points are note worthy. The updated terrorism dynamics from 
Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) are only available up to the year 2012. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic variables from ADI of the World Bank are also not available 
after the year 2012. The periodicity begins from 1996 because good governance indicators 
from the World Bank are only available from this year. In order to remain consistent with 
previous literature (Asongu et al., 2016a, 2016b), the adopted periodicity is 1998-2012.   
 Four different but related terrorism dependent variables are used, namely: domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism indicators. The terrorism indicators represent 
terrorism incidents experienced by a given country on a yearly basis. The positive skew and 
concerns about logarithmic transformation of zeros in the data are corrected by adding one to 
the base before taking natural logarithms of terrorism incidents. A similar approach has been 
recently adopted by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a, 2017b); Choi and Salehyan (2013); 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi and Asongu (2016).  
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). 
Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals 
of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters 
are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is  “ terrorism including those 
acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
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 Inclusive development and military expenditure are used as the principal independent 
variables. There is an evolving stream of literature documenting that the sympathy for and 
adherence to terrorist organisations is fundamentally motivated by exclusive socio-economic 
development (see Bass, 2014). Foster (2014) has confirmed this narrative with emphasis that 
Western-born and -educated youths are joining ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  
) principally because they feel excluded and/or are being treated as foreigners in developed 
nations they consider theirs. The narrative has also been maintained by Tonwe and Eke (2013) 
who have posited that asymmetric development is a fuel behind the burgeoning Nigerian 
Boko Haram. Accordingly, compared to the Southern region of the country, the Northern part 
is less developed. The inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI) is used as the 
indicator of inclusive development, in accordance with recent African inclusive development 
literature (see Asongu et al., 2015). This indicator is selected because of data availability 
constraints in other indicators like the Gini index for inequality. Moreover, recent inclusive 
growth indicators which are based on the Gini coefficient have issues of limited degrees of 
freedom because these indicators are based on non-overlapping intervals (e.g. see Mlachila et 
al., 2016). There is also an evolving strand of literature on the relationship between military 
expenditure and terrorism (see Feridum &  Shahbaz, 2010; Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006).  
 In order to control for omitted variable bias, four main control variables are used, 
namely: internet penetration, economic growth, inflation and political stability. According to 
Holbrook (2015) and Argomaniz (2015), the internet is growingly being used by mainstream 
terrorism organisations like ISIL to recruit and coordinate terrorist activities. As established 
by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b, 2017c), we expect high (low) inflation to be associated 
with high (low) possibilities of political strife and violence. This is essentially because; 
chaotic inflation decreases purchasing power and portrays a negative economic outlook for 
investment, employment and economic growth. These factors are likely to fuel socio-political 
unrests. From intuition and empirical evidence, economic prosperity is expected to reduce the 
likelihood for activities of terrorism because it is associated with the availability of more 
financial resources needed to fight the scourge. Recent empirical evidence supporting this 
intuition is from Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009). The authors have maintained that compared 
to high income countries, low income countries lack the financial resources to absorb 
terrorism-related shocks without substantial negative development externalities. Political 
stability is preferred to the other nine governance indicators used by Asongu et al. (2016b) 
because in Asongu et al. (2016a, 2016b) it is the most effective governance weapon for 
deterring terrorism, both in terms of significance and magnitude of significance. It is 
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important to note that some social variables like education and democracy are indirectly used 
in the analysis because they are positively correlated with variables in the conditioning 
information set. For instance, whereas education is a component of the IHDI, democracy is by 
definition captured by political stability.  
 The definitions of variables, summary statistics and correlation matrix have been 
disclosed respectively in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. It is apparent from the 
summary statistics that the variables are comparable from the perspective of mean values. 
Corresponding standard deviations show substantial variations. Hence, we can be confident 
that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge from the regressions. The purpose of the 
correlation matrix is essentially to limit potential concerns about multicollinearity. From a 
preliminary examination, issues about high degrees of substitution are exclusively apparent 
between terrorism variables. Fortunately, the issues are not of the nature to bias specifications 
because, the terrorism variables are exclusively used as dependent variables in distinct 
specifications.  
The theoretical and empirical justifications for the criteria used to determine 
fundamental features have been discussed by Asongu et al. (2016a). In essence, the 
comparative criteria is based on the following features:  legal origins (English common law 
vs French civil law), political stability (conflict-affected vs politically stable), resource-wealth 
(resource-rich vs resource-poor), income levels (low- vs middle-income), regional proximity 
(SSA vs North Africa), openness to sea (landlocked and unlandlocked) and religious 
domination (Islam vs Christianity).  
The definitions of fundamental characteristics are disclosed in Appendix 4. 
Furthermore, the statistical validity for the choice of fundamental features on the one hand 
and differences in terrorism dynamics within fundamental features on the other hand, are 
provided respectively in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6. The “difference in means” tests which 
are overwhelmingly significant support the statistical validity for the: (i) choice of 
fundamental characteristics and (ii) distinction of terrorism dynamics within fundamental 
characteristics. Owing to lack of space, in accordance with recent terrorism literature 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu  & Nwachukwu, 2016a), the country-specific 
descriptive statistics is available upon request. 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
 For the purpose of simplicity, common sense and evidence from the engaged 
literature, the study assumes the presence of endogeneity
1
. As recently shown by Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2015), the nexus between exclusive developments (e.g. inequality) only becomes 
apparent “once endogeneity is properly accounted for by means of an instrumental-variable 
approach” (p. 1). Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) respectively represent contemporary, non-
contemporary and instrument variable (IV) fixed effects (FE) specifications.  
tititih
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                            
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4
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                     
(3)  
 
where, tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic, transnational, unclear and total) of country i  
at  
period t ;  tiH ,  
denotes inclusive human development; tiM ,  
is military expenditure  ; 0 is a 
constant;
 
W  is the vector of control variables  (Internet, economic growth, inflation and 
political stability),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant, ti ,  the 
error term, 1, tiH , represents  inclusive human development  in country i  
at  period 1t  
term, 1, tiM , denotes  military expenditure  in country i  
at  period 1t , tiIVH , , represents  
instrumented inclusive human development  in country i
 
at  period t  and  tiIVM ,   denotes  
instrumented military expenditure  in country i
 
at  period t . tiIVH ,  and tiIVM ,  are 
instrumented respectively with Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) below.  
 
  titijti HH ,1,,   
 
                                                                   (4) 
                                                 
1
 The problem of endogeneity is so fundamental in regressions. This is why most regression techniques are 
designed to address the issue. For instance, the use of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) addresses 
endogeneity of: (i) simultaneity by means of the instrumentation process and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity 
by controlling for time invariant omitted variables. To the best of our knowledge, most studies applying the 
GMM do not test for endogeneity before adopting the technique because there is hardly a specification that is 
free from the concern of endogeneity. The GMM technique is not employed here in because the N>T criterion 
for its application is not met by some sub-samples or fundamental characteristics. 
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  titijti MM ,1,,                                                                        (5) 
The instrumentation procedure consists of regressing the independent variables of interest on 
their first lags and then saving the fitted values that are subsequently used as the main 
independent variables in Eq. (3). The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) consistent in standard errors. The instrumentation 
procedure is consistent with recent African comparative development literature (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 1 presents initial regressions, while Table 2 displays findings based on 
fundamental characteristics. For brevity and lack of space, only the estimated coefficients 
corresponding to the independent variables of interest (inclusive development and military 
expenditure) are presented in Table 2. Panel A, B, C and D respectively present results 
corresponding to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total 
terrorism. Each panel is further decomposed into three sub-panels for contemporary, non-
contemporary and instrumental variable (IV) Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) regressions.  
The following findings can be established from Table 1. (1) Inclusive human 
development consistently has an unexpected positive sign on domestic terrorism and total 
terrorism in contemporary, non-contemporary and 2SLS, with the exception of unclear 
terrorism in contemporary regressions where the effect is not significant. (2) The effect of 
military expenditure has expected signs exclusively in non-contemporary and 2SLS 
regressions, with: (i) a negative (positive) effect on transnational (total) terrorism in non-
contemporary specifications and (ii) negative impacts on transnational, domestic and total 
terrorisms, in increasing order to negative magnitude. (3) With the exception of inflation 
which displays an unexpected negative sign, significant control variables have expected signs. 
However, it is important to note that low/stable inflation could be a deterrent to socio-political 
unrest because it maintains purchasing power while at the same improving the economic 
outlook for employment and development.  
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Table 1: Baseline results     
             
 Dependent variables: terrorism dynamics  
    
 Contemporary FE Non Contemporary FE 2SLS 
    
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.215* 0.008 0.025 0.284** 0.226** 0.181*** 0.033 0.361*** 0.324** 0.223*** 0.035 0.471*** 
 (0.077) (0.190) (0.702) (0.025) (0.043) (0.009) (0.454) (0.002) (0.014) (0.007) (0.515) (0.001) 
Inclusive development  0.041*** 0.008 0.019*** 0.047*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.190) (0.001) (0.000)         
Inclusive development (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.026*** 0.008 0.001 0.026** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.009) (0.147) (0.639) (0.011)     
Inclusive development (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.035*** 0.013 0.003 0.035** 
         (0.009) (0.113) (0.476) (0.011) 
Military Expenditure -0.020 -0.009 0.011 -0.012 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.649) (0.726) (0.645) (0.795)         
Military Expenditure (-1) --- --- --- --- -0.061 -0.062** 0.004 0.079* --- --- --- --- 
     (0.140) (0.017) (0.773) (0.065)     
Military Expenditure (IV) --- --- --- --- ---  --- --- -0.095* -0.077** 0.004 -0.114** 
         (0.058) (0.014) (0.828) (0.027) 
Internet  0.016*** 0.002 0.001 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.423) (0.480) (0.006) (0.000) (0.207) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.313) (0.004) (0.000) 
GDPg  -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011** -0.006* -0.013 -0.010 -0.011** -0.007* -0.015* 
 (0.590) (0.265) (0.133) (0.377) (0.469) (0.037) (0.063) (0.127) (0.273) (0.039) (0.057) (0.098) 
Inflation  -0.002*** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.005*** 
 (0.005) (0.464) (0.227) (0.176) (0.001) (0.005) (0.320) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.313) (0.000) 
Political  Stability -0.446*** -0.365*** -0.116** -0.549*** -0.467*** -0.377*** -0.058 -0.603*** -0.477*** -0.368*** -0.066 -0.587*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) 
             
             
R²(Within) 0.123 0.106 0.058 0.134 0.163 0.145 0.043 0.187 0.162 0.133 0.046 0.177 
             
Fisher 9.78*** 8.30*** 4.33*** 10.76*** 12.50*** 10.85*** 2.88*** 14.77*** 11.31*** 9.04*** 2.86*** 12.62*** 
Countries  49 49 49 49 48 48 48 48 45 45 45 45 
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 437 437 437 402 402 402 402 
             
Notes. ***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. FE: Fixed Effects. Trans: transnational.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least Squares. (-1): non 
contemporary. (IV): instrumental variable. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth. 
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Table 2 provides findings based on the engaged fundamental characteristics. The 
following results are apparent for domestic terrorism.  (i) In contemporary regressions, 
whereas the effect of military expenditure is not significant, the impact of inclusive 
development is negative (positive) in resource-rich and North African countries (middle 
income, upper middle income, resource-poor, unlandlocked, conflict-free, SSA, Christian-
dominated and African nations). (ii) In non-contemporary regressions, the effect  of military 
expenditure is positive in landlocked, conflict-free and North African countries while the 
impact is positive from inclusive development in middle income, lower middle income, 
English common law, French civil law, resource-poor, unlandlocked, conflict-free, SSA, 
Christian-dominated and African countries. (iii) In 2SLS, the impact of military expenditure is 
negative in SSA, low income, African, landlocked, North African and conflict-free countries, 
in order of increasing negative magnitude.  
We notice the following for transnational terrorism. (i) In contemporary regressions, 
while the impact of military expenditure is not significant, the impact of inclusive 
development is positive in low income, lower middle income, French civil law, landlocked, 
conflict-affected, SSA and Islam-oriented countries. (ii) In non-contemporary regressions, 
inclusive human development is positive in low income, lower middle income, French civil 
law, resource-rich, landlocked, SSA and Islam-oriented countries whereas military 
expenditure is negative on SSA, low-income, landlocked, African, Christian-dominated, 
resource-rich, resource poor, conflict free, upper middle income and North African countries. 
(iii) In 2SLS, inclusive human development is positive in low income, lower middle income, 
English common law, French civil law, resource-rich, landlocked, unlandlocked, SSA, Islam-
oriented countries while military expenditure is negative in low-income, landlocked, SSA, 
African, Christian-dominated, resource-poor, resource-rich, conflict-free, North African and 
upper middle income countries.  
The following can be established for unclear terrorism.  (i) In contemporary 
regressions, military expenditure is not significant, whereas is it positive (negative) in middle 
income, English common law, resource-poor, unlandlocked, conflict-free, SSA, Christian-
dominated and African countries (landlocked, low income and North African nations). (ii) In 
non-contemporary regressions, inclusive development (military expenditure) is positive in 
lower middle income (upper middle income) countries. (iii) In 2SLS regressions, inclusive 
development (military expenditure) is positive in lower middle income and SSA (upper 
middle income and North Africa) countries. 
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The following are note-worthy for total terrorism. (i) In contemporary regressions, 
military expenditure is not significant whereas in inclusive development, it is negatively 
significant in North African countries, and  positive in middle income, upper middle income, 
English common law, French civil law, resource-poor, unlandlocked, conflict-free, SSA, 
Christian-dominated and African countries. (ii) In non-contemporary regressions, military 
expenditure is negative on SSA, Africa, low income, landlocked, resource-poor and conflict-
free countries. On the other hand, inclusive human development is positive in middle income, 
lower middle income, upper middle income, English common law, French civil law, conflict-
free, unlandlocked, SSA, Islam-oriented and African countries. (iii) In 2SLS, on the one hand, 
inclusive human development is positive in middle-income, lower-middle-income, English 
common law, French civil law, resource-poor, unlandlocked, conflict-free, SSA, Christian-
dominated, Islam-oriented and African countries. On the other hand, military expenditure has 
a negative effect in low income, resource-poor, landlocked, conflict-free, SSA, Christian-
dominated and African countries.  
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Table 2: Summary of comparative results  
                  
      
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism 
      
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
                  
  Panel A1: Contemporary  FE  
    
IHDI -1.716 0.038*** 4.708 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.707 -13.218* 0.038*** -0.063 0.044*** 4.767 0.035*** 0.052*** -16.45** 0.043*** -0.381 0.041*** 
 (0.224) (0.001) (0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.616) (0.054) (0.000) (0.965) (0.000) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.868) (0.000) 
MilitaryE -0.033 -0.022 0.003 -0.144 0.037 -0.015 0.002 -0.004 -0.065 0.004 0.021 -0.064 -0.012 -0.270 0.028 -0.048 -0.020 
 (0.517) (0.842) (0.981) (0.311) (0.752) (0.751) (0.979) (0.931) (0.197) (0.960) (0.775) (0.249) (0.781) (0.204) (0.629) (0.502) (0.649) 
                  
 Panel A2: Non Contemporary  FE 
                  
IHDI(-1) -1.876 0.021** 13.868*** 0.012 0.028** 2.658* -3.965 0.022** 0.681 0.028*** 0.558 0.021** 0.037*** -8.059 0.028*** 2.143 0.026*** 
 (0.176) (0.046) (0.005) (0.158) (0.011) (0.073) (0.517) (0.014) (0.626) (0.008) (0.841) (0.014) (0.000) (0.251) (0.005) (0.385) (0.009) 
MilitaryE(-1) -0.063 -0.142 -0.164 -0.087 -0.132 -0.037 -0.061 -0.059 -0.075* -0.075 -0.024 -0.126** -0.056 -0.478** -0.023 -0.092 -0.061 
 (0.158) (0.176) (0.206) (0.616) (0.237) (0.380) (0.385) (0.243) (0.087) (0.447) (0.718) (0.014) (0.169) (0.033) (0.678) (0.144) (0.140) 
                  
 Panel A3: IV 2SLS 
                  
IHDIIV -1.835 0.027* 13.881*** 0.004 0.049*** 2.785* -4.141 0.029** 0.666 0.039*** 1.317 0.026** 0.060*** -7.411 0.040*** 1.687 0.035*** 
 (0.207) (0.056) (0.006) (0.736) (0.002) (0.072) (0.512) (0.022) (0.637) (0.007) (0.654) (0.028) (0.000) (0.288) (0.005) (0.505) (0.009) 
MilitaryEIV -0.093* -0.199 -0.216 -0.122 -0.187 -0.062 -0.102 -0.099 -0.112** -0.121 -0.065 -1.479** -0.087* -0.516** -0.056 -0.124 -0.095* 
 (0.089) (0.106) (0.155) (0.550) (0.159) (0.225) (0.236) (0.108) (0.031) (0.331) (0.443) (0.015) (0.079) (0.042) (0.411) (0.102) (0.058) 
                  
                  
 Panel B: Transnational  Terrorism 
      
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
                  
 Panel B1: Contemporary  FE 
IHDI 2.769*** 0.008 5.514* 0.007 0.008 3.495*** 7.937 0.006 1.924** 0.010 7.072* 0.006 0.011* 0.969 0.007 3.320** 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.259) (0.070) (0.219) (0.144) (0.000) (0.177) (0.195) (0.015) (0.145) (0.066) (0.189) (0.061) (0.840) (0.183) (0.030) (0.190) 
MilitaryE 0.044* -0.055 -0.018 -0.092 -0.039 0.047 -0.035 -0.021 0.010 -0.054 0.016 -0.046 -0.004 0.032 -0.002 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.093) (0.479) (0.861) (0.419) (0.544) (0.155) (0.621) (0.469) (0.705) (0.399) (0.800) (0.121) (0.869) (0.835) (0.950) (0.857) (0.726) 
 Panel B2: Non Contemporary  FE 
                  
IHDI(-1) 2.105*** 0.009 9.437*** 0.008 0.009 3.096*** 12.071** 0.006 1.733** 0.010 2.999 0.007 0.012** 8.277 0.007 5.408*** 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.221) (0.007) (0.184) (0.111) (0.000) (0.019) (0.202) (0.028) (0.131) (0.227) (0.144) (0.044) (0.149) (0.144) (0.002) (0.147) 
MilitaryE(-1) -0.049** -0.060 0.032 -0.275** 0.019 -0.045 -0.098* -0.084*** -0.050** -0.070 -0.019 -0.114*** -0.048* -0.309* -0.075** -0.048 -0.062** 
 (0.034) (0.422) (0.725) (0.026) (0.734) (0.133) (0.099) (0.004) (0.039) (0.277) (0.755) (0.000) (0.052) (0.088) (0.011) (0.272) (0.017) 
                  
 Panel B3: IV 2SLS 
IHDIIV 2.203*** 0.013 9.403*** 0.011 0.015** 4.100*** 11.995** 0.009 1.781** 0.015* 3.282 0.009 0.019** 8.029 0.010 5.412*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.182) (0.008) (0.239) (0.047) (0.000) (0.024) (0.193) (0.027) (0.090) (0.213) (0.140) (0.021) (0.168) (0.175) (0.002) (0.113) 
MilitaryEIV -0.051* -0.108 0.010 -0.380** -0.018 -0.045 -0.125* -0.096*** -0.055* -0.122 -0.030 -0.126*** -0.061** -0.361* -0.093** -0.063 -0.077** 
 (0.069) (0.225) (0.918) (0.018) (0.780) (0.221) (0.081) (0.006) (0.058) (0.128) (0.691) (0.000) (0.042) (0.085) (0.010) (0.230) (0.014) 
                  
                  
 Panel C: Unclear Terrorism   
      
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
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 Panel C1: Contemporary   FE 
                  
IHDI -1.381** 0.017** 3.149 0.010 0.019*** -0.978 -8.780 0.018*** -1.284* 0.019*** 1.780 0.017*** 0.022*** -9.878*** 0.018*** -1.256 0.019*** 
 (0.038) (0.010) (0.104) (0.279) (0.004) (0.179) (0.100) (0.000) (0.087) (0.001) (0.512) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.351) (0.001) 
MilitaryE 0.007 -0.005 -0.040 -0.060 -0.015 0.008 -0.006 0.044 0.0004 0.017 -0.013 0.029 0.012 0.031 0.045 -0.021 0.011 
 (0.762) (0.934) (0.555) (0.714) (0.834) (0.751) (0.921) (0.107) (0.988) (0.750) (0.782) (0.338) (0.613) (0.776) (0.144) (0.623) (0.645) 
                  
 Panel C2: Non Contemporary  FE 
                  
IHDI(-1) -0.213 0.0006 6.139*** -0.002 0.002 0.694 -0.947 0.0007 0.129 0.002 0.649 0.0002 0.005 -1.072 0.001 1.065 0.001 
 (0.642) (0.892) (0.009) (0.485) (0.665) (0.176) (0.812) (0.799) (0.758) (0.606) (0.656) (0.940) (0.210) (0.728) (0.657) (0.422) (0.639) 
MilitaryE(-1) 0.006 -0.005 -0.056 0.153* -0.040 0.021 -0.004 0.009 0.005 0.031 -0.020 0.022 -0.004 0.160 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.671) (0.921) (0.365) (0.063) (0.447) (0.145) (0.926) (0.558) (0.667) (0.486) (0.572) (0.253) (0.813) (0.102) (0.874) (0.895) (0.773) 
                  
 Panel C3: IV 2SLS 
                  
IHDIIV -0.206 0.001 6.587*** -0.003 0.007 0.740 -0.918 0.001 0.123 0.004 0.858 0.0007 0.011* -0.927 0.003 1.094 0.003 
 (0.673) (0.803) (0.006) (0.566) (0.322) (0.173) (0.826) (0.708) (0.775) (0.458) (0.586) (0.864) (0.051) (0.767) (0.467) (0.434) (0.476) 
MilitaryEIV 0.005 -0.002 -0.052 0.192* -0.049 0.024 -0.011 0.009 0.005 0.041 -0.024 0.024 -0.005 0.188* 0.001 0.0006 0.004 
 (0.756) (0.972) (0.469) (0.082) (0.442) (0.176) (0.837) (0.663) (0.731) (0.469) (0.600) (0.291) (0.785) (0.095) (0.939) (0.987) (0.828) 
                  
                  
 Panel D: Total Terrorism 
      
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
                  
 Panel D1: Contemporary  FE 
                  
IHDI 0.255 0.044*** 7.381 0.038*** 0.049*** 3.385** -6.385 0.045*** 1.654 0.050*** 7.483 0.042*** 0.057*** -11.649* 0.050*** 2.373 0.047*** 
 (0.864) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.331) (0.000) (0.280) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.288) (0.000) 
MilitaryE -0.001 0.003 0.038 -0.083 0.044 0.030 0.040 -0.026 -0.040 0.018 0.067 -0.091 -0.006 -0.115 0.006 0.009 -0.012 
 (0.977) (0.978) (0.812) (0.582) (0.706) (0.581) (0.622) (0.648) (0.460) (0.853) (0.429) (0.119) (0.890) (0.603) (0.923) (0.896) (0.795) 
                  
 Panel D2: Non Contemporary  FE 
                  
IHDI(-1) 0.024 0.022** 17.219*** 0.015* 0.028*** 5.843*** 2.242 0.023** 2.315 0.029*** 1.392 0.022** 0.037*** -1.665 1.392 0.029*** 0.026** 
 (0.986) (0.044) (0.001) (0.071) (0.008) (0.000) (0.704) (0.019) (0.116) (0.008) (0.657) (0.014) (0.000) (0.820) (0.657) (0.005) (0.011) 
MilitaryE(-1) -0.086* -0.074 -0.051 -0.106 -0.072 -0.043 -0.062 -0.108** -0.096** -0.013 0.002 -0.177*** -0.072* -0.356 0.002 -0.090 -0.079* 
 (0.060) (0.491) (0.702) (0.519) (0.502) (0.342) (0.363) (0.048) (0.036) (0.897) (0.976) (0.001) (0.088) (0.127) (0.976) (0.128) (0.065) 
                  
 Panel D3: IV 2SLS 
                  
IHDIIV 0.156 0.027* 17.230*** 0.009 0.047*** 6.131*** 2.058 0.029** 2.373 0.040*** 2.099 0.027** 0.058*** -1.506 0.042*** 5.450** 0.035** 
 (0.916) (0.058) (0.001) (0.437) (0.002) (0.000) (0.734) (0.028) (0.111) (0.007) (0.524) (0.027) (0.000) (0.840) (0.005) (0.027) (0.011) 
MilitaryEIV -0.114** -0.130 -0.090 -0.158 -0.127 -0.061 -0.092 -0.155** -0.131** -0.057 -0.031 -0.203*** -0.105** -0.397 -0.138* -0.081 -0.114** 
 (0.043) (0.303) (0.559) (0.407) (0.315) (0.269) (0.268) (0.019) (0.016) (0.649) (0.746) (0.001) (0.038) (0.142) (0.054) (0.267) (0.027) 
                  
Notes. ***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. MilitaryE: Military Expenditure. (-1): non contemporary. (IV): instrumental variable. FE: 
Fixed Effects. Trans: transnational.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least Squares. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth. Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. 
UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated 
countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries.  
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4. 2 Further discussion of results and implications 
 
4.2.1 Nexus with debates in the literature  
 
 From a broad African perspective, the positive and insignificant effects of inclusive 
human development on terrorism are consistent with the strand of literature maintaining that 
human and economic developments have no (positive)   effect(s) on terrorism. These include 
studies that have established: a positive nexus between economic development and terrorism 
(Gassenbner & Luechinger, 2011; Blomberg et al., 2004) and no relationship between 
economic development and terrorism/civil wars (Piazza, 2006; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; 
Østby, 2008, p. 143). Moreover, the findings also run counter to the stream of literature on the 
absence of a relationship between inclusive/exclusive development and terrorism (Li, 2005; 
Piazza, 2006; Abadie, 2006).   
 The findings on military expenditure are contingent on the treatment for endogeneity. 
Whereas positive effects are established in the presence of endogeneity, negative effects are 
apparent in some non-contemporary regressions (with the exception of total terrorism) after 
some partial treatment for endogeneity and consistently negative in 2SLS regressions 
probably because of a better treatment for endogeneity through an instrumental variable 
approach. The contemporary findings are consistent with the literature maintaining that:  
military measures alone are insufficient in fighting terrorism and could even fuel more 
terrorism (Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). We argue that the 
strand of literature consistently documenting positive nexuses between military spending and 
terrorism may be statistically fragile in terms of the treatment of endogeneity. For instance, 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) have recently established that expected signs between 
macroeconomic variables and terrorism are apparent exclusively after controlling for 
endogeneity. This is a theoretical contribution we engage in more depth in Section 4.2.3.  
 
4.2.2 Contributions to the comparative economics  
 
 Whereas from baseline or broad African findings, we have seen that inclusive human 
development increases terrorism, there are some pockets of negative relationships from 
certain fundamental characteristics of African development. Accordingly, in contemporary 
specifications, inclusive human development negatively affects: (i) domestic terrorism in 
North African and resource-rich countries; (ii) unclear terrorism in low income, landlocked 
and North African countries and (iii) total terrorism in North African countries. It is 
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consistently apparent that contemporary inclusive human development reduces terrorism in 
North Africa.  
 On the other hand, when the effect of military expenditure is observed from the prism 
of fundamental characteristics, the negative relationship established based on a full African 
sample is confirmed with the following additional insights: (i) many significant negative 
effects across fundamental characteristics and (ii) some scanty evidence of positive 
relationships in a few fundamental features (e.g. see “unclear terrorism”-related regressions 
where there is a significant effect in North African and Upper middle income countries in 
2SLS and Upper middle income in non-contemporary regressions). In addition to between-
comparison of fundamental features, within-comparison in fundamental characteristics also 
provides valuable insights. 
 The following comparative insights are apparent from within-fundamental features. (1) 
For income-levels, after controlling for endogeneity, only military expenditure in low income 
and upper middle income countries have negative effects, with: (i) the effect exclusively 
significant in low income countries for domestic and total terrorisms and (ii) a higher 
significant magnitude from upper middle income countries in transnational terrorism 
regressions. (2) Significant effects are not apparent from both types of  legal origins. (3) In 
terms of petroleum exports, military expenditure is significant: (i) in both resource-rich and 
resource-poor countries on transnational terrorism, with a higher magnitude from the former; 
(ii) exclusively in resource-poor countries for total terrorism. (4) Only landlocked countries 
significantly use military expenditure to reduce terrorism and this is true of domestic, 
transnational and total terrorism dynamics. (5) In the same vein, only conflict-free countries 
can significantly use increased military spending to mitigate terrorism. A nexus that is also 
apparent in domestic, transitional and total terrorism dynamics. (6) Both SSA and North 
African countries can employ the military expenditure policy instrument to mitigate terrorism 
with a higher magnitude in North African countries for domestic and transnational terrorism 
dynamics. On the other hand, a negative nexus is apparent only in SSA for total terrorism. (7) 
Only Christian-dominated countries significantly reduce transnational and total terrorisms 
with military expenditure. 
 It is apparent from the above findings that the effect of income levels in the role of 
military expenditure in the battle against terrorism is significant at the tails of the income-
distributions, notably in low income and upper middle income countries (see transnational 
terrorism regressions). This direction of results confirms previous literature on the position 
that wealth per se may not be sufficient in explaining why military expenditure works in 
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certain countries. This is essentially because; effects in lower middle and middle income 
countries are not consistently significant.  In what follows, we discuss some of the reasons 
underlying the comparative advantages in the propensity to use military expenditure in 
fighting terrorism. 
 First, we have established that the propensity of military expenditure to fight 
transnational terrorism is higher in upper middle income countries vis-à-vis their low income 
counterparts. This finding is consistent with our intuition because compared to high income 
countries, low income countries are expected to reflect more persistence in terrorism because 
wealthier nations are endowed with more military capabilities with which to mitigate and 
prevent terrorism. This narrative on high income countries is consistent with Gaibulloev and 
Sandler (2009) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) in the perspective that foreign aid flows 
from high income to low income countries because the latter lack the resources and facilities 
with which to mitigate the negative consequences of terrorism in developing countries.  
 Second, it is also apparent from the findings that the sensitivity of transnational 
terrorism to military expenditure is higher in oil-rich countries vis-à-vis their oil-poor 
counterparts. This finding can also be logical given the premise that oil-rich countries are 
comparatively   higher income countries vis-à-vis their oil-poor countries. This explanation is 
consistent with the previous paragraph on the basis of income levels in the effectiveness of 
military expenditure in fighting terrorism.  
 Third, it is also apparent from the findings that the sensitivity of domestic and 
transnational terrorism to military expenditure is higher in landlocked countries compared to 
their unlandlocked counterparts. This may be explained by the fact that landlocked countries 
may be more specialised in dealing with political instability and political terror which, are 
inherent costs associated with landlockedness. It is important to note that recent literature has 
established that compared to countries that are open to the sea, there are economic and 
institutional costs associated with landlockedness (Arvis et al., 2007; Asongu & Le Roux, 
2017).  
 Fourth, the finding that the propensity of military expenditure to fighting domestic and 
transnational terrorism is higher in non-conflict countries vis-à-vis their conflict-affected 
counterpart is quite logical and straight forward. This is essentially because non-conflict 
countries are also associated with a lower propensity to political instability and political 
terror. Fifth, the ability of North African countries to use military expenditure more 
effectively in fighting terrorism is consistent with previous narratives in fact that compared 
countries in SSA, North African countries are wealthier. Sixth, given that terrorism is largely 
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perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists, political terror could be more persistent in Islamic-
oriented countries. Hence, the higher propensity of military expenditure in combating 
transnational terrorism in Christian-dominated countries compared to their Islam-oriented 
counterparts.  
 
 
4.2.3 Practical and theoretical contributions  
 
 We discuss four main practical and theoretical contributions, notably: (i) military 
spending having the expected sign and inclusive human development not displaying the 
expected sign for the most part; (ii) the magnitude of effect on terrorism dynamics; (iii) the 
need to control for fundamental characteristics and (iv) the imperative to account for 
endogeneity in specifications.  
First, we have for the most part observed that military spending is more effective in 
fighting terrorism. Assuming that increasing military expenditure is in response to terrorism 
threats and activities, the findings make practical sense because while inclusive human 
development is meant to deter citizens from resorting to violent means to question the socio-
political and institutional status quo, military spending has a more direct effect in swiftly 
curbing terrorists’ activities. Moreover, the positive effect of inclusive human development 
may imply that, in spite of inclusive development and better economic governance efforts by 
sampled countries, motivations for terrorism are traceable to frustrations from some circles 
(e.g. the elite and middle class) which do not perceive growing equitable distribution of 
economic resources as positive for their interests.  
Within this framework, frustration (discontent) over the unequal distribution of 
economic resources as a cause of political aggression (violence) may not be so apparent. 
Instead, such discontent may be from the elites governing existing politico-economic 
institutions that are infuriated over the redistribution of economic resources. Hence, the elite 
can mobilize sufficient resources to coordinate activities of political instability and violence 
that would enable them promote their vested interests or consolidate existing institutions that 
protect such interests. 
 The above narrative accords with the view that the middle class in Africa which is 
composed of the elite (for the most part) may not be sympathetic to demands for better 
economic governance because of its dependence on the resources of the state and preferences 
to specific markets (see Poulton, 2014). Moreover, Poulton (2014) and Resnick (2015) have 
suggested that the African middle class may stall socio-economic transformations by skilfully 
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using external threats like terrorism to retain a tight grip on power. Hence, our inferences are 
contingent on the perspective that frustrations on the improvement of economic governance 
are substantially traceable to the elite with political connections as opposed to the elite that is 
genuinely earning from innovation, free enterprise and the market economy. This narrative is 
in line with the skepticism of Rodrik (2015) on the role of the African elite and middle class 
in governance transformations.  
 Second, we have established that the negative effect from military expenditure is 
highest in total terrorism, followed by domestic terrorism and last by transnational terrorism. 
The fact that effects on unclear terrorism are not overwhelmingly significant is consistent with 
intuition because military measures are specifically designed to target terrorism that can be 
explicitly evaluated, certified or established. The effect on total terrorism is highest because 
total terrorism is the sum of three terrorism dynamics, namely: domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorism. The higher magnitude on domestic terrorism compared to transnational 
terrorism is also consistent with intuition and specificities of variables employed. 
Accordingly, whereas domestic terrorism is for the most part motivated by economic 
grievances (see Piazza, 2013), frustrations fuelling transnational terrorism are substantially 
traceable to disenchantment in foreign policy decisions by wealthy democracies (see Savun & 
Phillips, 2009). 
 Third, it is important to control for fundamental characteristics for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, from broad African findings, we have found that the effect of inclusive 
human development is either not significant or positively significant, whereas the impact is 
negatively significant in some fundamental characteristics. On the other hand, while the 
impact of military spending is overwhelmingly significant with negative effects on some 
terrorism dynamics in baseline regressions, the negative nexus is not significant in all 
fundamental characteristics. It follows that blanket inclusive development policies in the fight 
against terrorism may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental features and 
tailored based on established linkages.  
 Fourth, there is need to account for endogeneity in order to establish effects that are 
consistent with intuition and theoretical underpinnings. This contribution confirms the caution 
by Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) on the need to control for endogeneity with an instrumental 
variable approach. Accordingly, we have observed both from the African sample and 
fundamental characteristics that military expenditure significantly decreases terrorism 
exclusively when endogeneity is accounted for.  
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5. Conclusion and further research directions 
 
 This study has investigated the role of inclusive human development and military 
expenditure in fighting terrorism in 53 African countries for the period 1998-2012. In order to 
avail room for more policy implications, the comparative emphasis has been articulated on the 
fundamental characteristics of African development, namely: legal origins (English common 
law vs French civil law), political stability (conflict-affected vs politically stable), resource-
wealth (resource-rich vs resource-poor), income levels (low- vs middle-income), regional 
proximity (SSA vs North Africa), openness to sea (landlocked and unlandlocked) and 
religious domination (Islam vs Christianity). The empirical evidence is based on 
contemporary, non-contemporary and instrumental variable Fixed Effects regressions. 
Compared to inclusive development, military expenditure is a better tool at fighting terrorism. 
Significant negative effects are established only when endogeneity is accounted for by means 
of non-contemporary and instrumental variables approaches. The signs and magnitudes of 
estimated coefficients are significantly contingent on adopted fundamental characteristics.  
 Contributions to the comparative economics have been discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
Practical and theoretical contributions are also provided, notably: military spending having 
the expected sign while inclusive human development not displaying the expected sign for the 
most part; the magnitude of effect on terrorism dynamics; the need to control for fundamental 
characteristics and imperative to account for endogeneity in specifications. From the findings, 
the propensity of military expenditure to fight transnational terrorism is higher in: (i) middle 
income countries vis-à-vis their low income counterparts; (ii) oil-rich countries compared to 
oil-poor countries and (iii) Christian-dominated countries vis-à-vis their Islam-oriented 
counterparts. Furthermore, military expenditure is also more effective at combating domestic 
and transnational terrorism in: (i) North African countries vis-à-vis their SSA counterparts; 
(ii) landlocked countries compared to countries that are open to the sea and (iii) politically-
stable countries vis-à-vis their politically-unstable counterparts.  
Overall, the main policy implication is that inclusive development is not a sufficient 
condition for the fight against terrorism whereas military expenditure can be effectively 
employed to mitigate terrorism. Hence, inclusive development (as a policy tool in the fight 
against terrorism) could be combined with other factors that have been confirmed to establish 
negative effects. Moreover, the policy effectiveness of employed tools is contingent on 
whether they are engaged proactively (i.e. non-contemporarily) or not.  In this light, future 
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inquiries devoted to improving established linkages could focus on assessing complementary 
factors with which inclusive human development can significantly reduce terrorism.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in 
Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. UNDP: United Nations 
Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.550 0.948 -3.220 1.188 742 
Domestic terrorism  0.414 0.892 0.000 6.234 901 
Transnational terrorism 0.221 0.541 0.000 3.332 901 
Unclear terrorism 0.097 0.389 0.000 4.888 901 
Total terrorism 0.540 1.002 0.000 6.300 901 
Internet penetration  4.243 7.773 0.000 55.416 874 
Inclusive development  0.912 4.448 0.127 45.325 687 
GDP growth  5.080 9.317 -62.075 149.973 875 
Inflation   16.586 150.256 -9.797 4145.108 803 
Military Expenditure  2.278 3.034 0.145 39.606 722 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 471) 
           
PS Internet IHDI GDPg Inflation Milit Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.205 0.028 0.005 -0.191 -0.238 -0.492 -0.492 -0.265 -0.554 PS 
 1.000 0.002 -0.053 -0.057 -0.067 0.076 0.025 0.041 0.053 Internet 
  1.000 -0.045 -0.011 -0.026 0.142 0.036 0.174 0.149 IHDI 
   1.000 -0.143 -0.101 -0.010 0.003 -0.072 -0.016 GDPg 
    1.000 -0.081 0.006 0.146 0.087 0.068 Inflation 
     1.000 0.141 0.081 0.081 0.155 Milit 
      1.000 0.580 0.625 0.957 Domter 
       1.000 0.461 0.743 Tranter 
        1.000 0.664 Unclter 
         1.000 Totter 
           
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. Internet: Internet Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. Milit: Military Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational  
Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
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Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
levels 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    
    
 
 
Regions  
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   47 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
Religion  Christianity  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
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Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya , Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
20 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
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Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
38 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Differences in means of fundamental characteristics  
         
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English Frenc
h 
Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.385) (0.000) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.381) Mid 
  na (0.341) (0000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.163) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.341) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000 (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.000) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 
brackets. Bold values represent significant differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
 
 
Appendix 6: Differences in means of fundamental characteristics in terrorism dynamics  
         
Panel A: Domestic Terrorism   
        
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.803) (0.002) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.803) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.055) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.438) (0.000) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) English 
     na (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.017) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) Conf 
           na (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.031) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel B: Transnational Terrorism   
                 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.047) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.234) (0.001) (0.702) (0.000) (0.000) (0.437) (0.061) Low 
 na (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.702) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.437) Mid 
  na (0.000) (0.895) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.908) (0.000) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.024) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) English 
     na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.295) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.303) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.303) (0.011) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
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              na (0.283) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel C: Unclear Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.069) (0.001) (0.000) (0.057) (0.519) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.495) (0.002) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.567) (0.068) Low 
 na (0.001) (0.000) (0.519) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.497) (0.000) (0.496) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.567) Mid 
  na (0.047) (0.025) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.765) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.007) (0.131) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.882) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.140) (0.022) (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) (0.882) (0.117) French 
      na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.002) (0.874) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.874) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.252) Conf 
           na (0.002) (0.000) (0.252) (0.007) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.260) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel D: Total Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.811) (0.001) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.811) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.454) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.023) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.018) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 
brackets. Bold values represent significant differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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